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ABSTRACT
Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse particular capital adequacy issues. The thesis is composed 
of  three  chapters,  each  dealing  with particular  aspects  of  capital  adequacy.  The introductory 
Chapter One clarifies the meaning of capital adequacy. 
The thesis  is  based on two main  aims.  Chapter  Two examines  Basel  Committee  of  Banking 
Supervision materials and following relevant EU and Czech legislation. The methodology used in 
this chapter vests in comparative analysis and legal analysis of current Czech national legislation. 
The first aim is to tackle the legal issues of implementation and effective enforcement of current 
capital adequacy rules, with concentration on the key problem of inconsistency of implementation 
among countries.
The Chapter Three describes the reasons for adoption of new regulatory rules of capital adequacy 
in connection with recent turbulent changes in financial markets. To make a conclusion whether 
Basel III is a sufficient reaction is the second main aim. It focuses on analyse of the Basel III 
rules as a set with some practical notes on ongoing implementation in the world or in the Czech 
Republic in particular. 
The Basel Committee rules need to be implemented carefully. Whether by partial or incomplete 
implementation  of  Basel  rules  or  by  national  discretions  and  options  under  the  EU  CRD 
directives, the global financial system can be undermined by all differences among countries. 
This is not a call for obligatory nature of Basel Committee rules – that solution is neither possible 
nor necessary.  Rather,  it  is a  summary that national  regulators and supervisors must  work in 
coordination to reach one common goal.
The  second  conclusion  concerns  Basel  III  rules  only.  Although  no  absolute  and  profound 
conclusions can be made without actual functioning of these rules, the preliminary outcome of the 
appropriateness of them is plain enough and evident. Though banks have done whatever to cut 
down the strictness of criteria under Basel III by discussions, consultations or financial studies 
(such endeavour is evidently less obvious in Czech Republic),  the necessity of making much 
stricter rules for own funds, especially Tier 1 capital, is duly justified. The conclusion I made in 
the Chapter Three is that new set of rules is appropriate and eligible to reach their goal. However, 
much will depend on how the supervisors will bring these rules to life.
